No. 15

<The time-relation of the pure Ego>

§ 1. The eidetic shape of the psychic internality. <Temporal   
primal genesis, Ego and hyle>

The general essence without which a uniform internality is inconceivable. Attitude of the phenomenological reduction: Recourse towards the stream of pure mental livings and the pure Ego of the mental livings, the immanent being, the necessary form of which is the „phenomenological time.“ But the further recourse from there towards the primal consciousness constituting immanent time objectivity.

The system of eidetic laws (the eidetic structure) of the consciousness constituting time is the in itself first and deepest eidetic law of a genesis in consciousness and at the same time of a genesis as primal constitution of objectivities. But we also had to state: Everything to be shown within the internality (in any internality as such) must be subject to the opposition Ego as subject’s pole of behavioral ways and related through them to all other immanent things, to its “surrounding world.” But if we say “internality”, then all this can relate to the immanent contents, but it can also relate to the consciousness constituting them. In first regard the form of the immanent time is the form of all objects of the surrounding world, likewise the form of all behavioral ways of the Ego, as streaming into the surrounding world, relating to it (or as affection to the Ego radiating from them, radiating simply as affecting impulses). The Ego itself as subject of the behavioral ways, as subject, for which the objects are there, constitutes itself for itself as temporal with the behavioral ways. The behavioral ways <are> reflective objectivities presupposing non-reflective objectivities (in a sensational way). Everything that shall be capable of being straightforwardly or reflectively for an Ego, must have the form of the time, which is a directly or reflectively graspable form, and as a form actually is a double one: non-reflective and reflective time, both forms “covering” each other and constituting themselves as [282] a single order of that which is graspable for the Ego.

A non-reflective surrounding world is necessary. Necessarily a hyle belongs to the non-reflective surrounding world, and we can speak of a hyletic surrounding world belonging to the necessary essential form of internality, as of an uncontroversially first necessity. No point of the immanent time without this first objective content, within the oriented immanent time no Now without hyletic primal impression, which then leads into the modifications (retentionally and protentionally) of the necessary life-constituting hyletic time objects. Further eidetic laws belong to this. The hyletic unities cannot be punctual, this means, they must combine to lasting time objects. Not only is the sentence “There is no hyletic-empty time stretch” accepted, but each hyle has its qualitative content, and this cannot change discontinuously from time point to time point. Discontinuities are only possible at the limits of continuously-qualitatively filled time-durations, etc.

The primal genesis (as an eidetic form), the form of the constitution of immanent hyletic objects is the basis for every other genesis, and all genesis performs itself in the primal form of the consciousness constituting time, insofar as not only every hyper-hyletic impression constitutes itself as an immanent date within time towards the behavioral ways of the Ego, but all that, which constitutes itself as object for the Ego at all, [constitutes itself] necessarily through phenomena within the frame of the immanent time. And at the same time, that, which constitutes itself as something individual as such, in such a way, that it cannot be given in an absolutely identical way twice within the surrounding world (originarily experienced, perceived), must be given as a temporal one, and if it is not an immanent date, as something transcendentally temporal, i.e. within a transcendent time, presenting itself through phenomena of the immanent time in coincidence. The time of the presenting phenomenon must present the time of that, which is presented.

But this as done too quickly. The constitution of the time initially leads to the immediately intuitive time stretch. But the constitution of the time itself and of a surrounding world fulfilling it, [283] presupposes reproduction and free possibilities for the Ego, to enter the time horizon through reproductions and to “re”present the past in the form of the “Again.”

Now there is the problem to fix the eidetic laws belonging to reproduction and association, and apart from that to research the eidetic laws possibly belonging to the formation of apperceptions. The internality is not only a stream of consciousness with the pure Ego; even if we speak of stream of consciousness as an endless phenomenon of phenomena, we have already some things presupposed, which needed to be fixed explicitly in the evidences of the basic essence. I do not simply find the stream of consciousness in such a way, as if I, as a purely perceiving Ego, were merely grasping, grasping as it were in empty viewing and taking up a stream that simply streams. There is not on the one hand a streaming and on the other side an empty viewing of the streaming, but the streaming and the unity of the stream is an intentional unity of a series of phenomena, a series of present phenomena having their complicated structure, and given in the consciousness of constant change, and represent an “I can go back,” every stretch of the change and every phase, every present and again let them turn into their further changes, which is a streaming itself, and proceeds in the form of time, has its present, etc.

The goal <is>: Working out of the essential form of the internality or of the psychic as a development (that is, eidetically necessary development), in which parallel a primarily purely hyletic surrounding world developed up as a first immanent temporal objectivity in an “intelligible” way and the Ego of the lowest level belonging to it, the latter into the empiric Ego, having a transcendent objective world in front of it, a world, which at the same time is a world of values, a world of objects, world of deed and an objective world, containing other personal I as bodily-psychic ones related to it.

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§ 2. The pure Ego and the time. <The Ego as all temporal individual and as secondary time object>

Is the Ego of the Cogito like a hyletic date and like other objects a unit constituting itself within the stream of consciousness, that is, [is it] a date itself, and then an individual date? Everything belonging to some internality is an actual or a possible date of this internality’s Ego. Thus, every immanent object has a peculiar connection with a conspicuous object Ego, and this is an object for itself. The Ego within a new Cogito is related to the old Cogito, and again in a new Cogito can the Cogito of the second level be grasped, etc. The Ego becomes objective and graspable thereby, identifiable as the same in all levels coming into view of the reflection. The reflecting Ego becomes an object only by way of some new reflection, having the Ego as a subject in a non-reflective way, and every reflection becomes visible in the higher reflection as entering and proceeding in the immanent time.

Thereby the Ego makes an appearance as an active one in the time and remains active through the active stretch of time. And the Ego of separated Cogitos is evidentially, as the reflection shows again, the same within the identifying. But temporally prior to the cogito the reflection possibly finds a stretch of the affection, of the stimulus of a not grasped objectivity for the Ego, which thus does not merely live within the Cogito. Objects of the immanent time are noticeable, but they are not noticed, <they are> not grasped objects; and the advertence, in which the Ego goes over to grasping, is itself a noticeable procedure, which possibly is noticed afterwards. Every grasping results in the grasped object with a horizon <of the> Prior, and thereby one meets incessantly something not grasped. The Ego is not an Ego continuously grasping through its whole immanent time, and even insofar as it is [grasping], there always remains a horizon of something not grasped. That which is not grasped is noticeable in such a sense that it is noticeable, it can go over into the grasping, whereas not each and everything that is not grasped can go over into the grasping in one go, whereby the horizon would fade.

[285] That I have cold feet enters my grasping now, but I become aware that this coldness pervades a long time stretch, it has pushed itself to the front repeatedly, and has been grasped, and in between it had not been grasped continuously, noticeable in a changing measure, namely affecting in changing power, but the affecting did not take place; as to the affective tendencies (I, as something noticeable in the reflection myself, grasp the draw, the drawing towards the Ego, to react in advertence, it is not a mere *façon de parler*) we need to ask, whether they are necessarily something belonging to the backgrounded. But did not then the tendencies (as something noticeable) as well need to bring along tendencies of a new level, again these and so *in infinitum*? This remains as a problem here.

Everything entering in the primal stream of consciousness, bound to its formal law, helps to constitute an immanent time, filled with immanent time objects. That some objectively filled immanent time is conscious at all, that is a formal necessity. The objects themselves, these objects with their determined content, thus beginning and ending, are contingent. But all these objects are objects for the Ego, apprehensibilities or something apprehended of the Ego, that is not an object in the same sense as all other objects of which I have just been speaking, and that as individual data were called contingencies in the temporal stream of the Ego. But the Ego as well is only, insofar as it can become an object for itself; the Ego as well is for itself a current and potential object. But it is still the subject, for which every other immanent thing is an object, and is itself an object for itself, whereby it finds itself as an immanent object in the form of the immanent time. As a subject for all its objects it has no contingency, but necessity.

It belongs to the essence of pure internality or of a pure stream of consciousness, that everything therein, as stated above, can change within the frame of the formal law of fulfilled immanent time, only the Ego [can] not. It is the necessary immanent individuality; if the objects change and if the affectings change, the advertences, etc., coming from the Ego or going towards the Ego, then something changes, which simply is able to change. The [286] essence of a concrete immanence and its necessities leave open such changes, that exactly this advertence happens, is a “contingent” happening, something individual within the form of the law, that is, something contingent. But we could indeed say everywhere here “individually, that is, contingently”, but simply not for the Ego. It persists otherwise, but it is the necessary individual and the only one. Otherwise it is only necessary that individuals as such are and individual happenings, and that they fill up the time.

If we go back to the primarily constituting life stream, then it has an essential structure, according to which sensual primal impressions emerge in an incessant primal generation, with a contingent (only determined by formal orders) content. In one with that and correlatively a single primal-Ego belongs to the stream, not contingently entering as an objective date, but necessarily thereby as a numerically single subject pole of Ego’s affections and Ego’s ways of behavior, which for their part are again subject to the temporally objective constitution. Thus the Ego constantly and necessarily going through the whole immanent time belongs to the constituted, temporally beginning and ending behavioral ways, something identical, whatever may affect and become a theme of the temporal advertences. Thus the immanent being appears in the form of the immanent time and as of such a kind, that a basic series of contingent “objects” fills up this time, and related to that another row of temporally lasting things, simply <of> the affectings and advertences, position takings, in short: the behavioral ways of the Ego, having their necessary unit in the “eternal” Ego, the all temporal individual, related to all objects through this way of behavior, can relate to its ways of behavior and to itself, and finds itself within time, and thus is a time object itself.

But it is not the case that a time object as such is conspicuous in contrast to all others, with special characteristics and among them universal relationships to all other time objects. It needs to be heeded that, while every immanent “object” is directly perceptible for the subject, <has> directly perceptible its Being-Now and in every new Now Being-thus-and-thus, stretch-oneself-consistently-through-the-time-in-such-and-such-a-way, [287] the Ego is only reflectively and only afterwards graspable. As the living Ego it performs acts and mentally lives affectings, acts and affectings entering time themselves and stretching continuously through it. But the living source point of this entering, and thereby the living point of being, with which the Ego itself enters a subject relationship with something temporal, and becomes itself something temporal and lasting, is in principal not perceptible in a direct way. Only <in> reflection being something afterwards, and only as a limit to that which is streaming past in the flow of time, is the Ego graspable, that is, by itself as the grasping and graspable original Ego. The primarily living Ego is the permanent and absolutely necessary correlate of all objects, it is by bearing a relationship in an affected way to them or by being turned to them, and thereby releasing new series of time happenings from itself according to its eidetic law, by the help of which it can become a reflective time object for itself. But its being is a totally different one from that of all objects. It is simply being a subject, and as that <it has its way> to live a primal life hovering above all temporal things, which soon enters temporality though and in a secondary way gives the Ego itself a position within time and duration within time as a subject’s pole of its experiences within time.

Perhaps one is allowed to say thus: Every act of the Ego is a new content, and all Ego’s acts have a peculiar unity, without having in common any “content”. The point of identity of all acts (and affectings), which, according to the objects, to which they are related, stretch through time (have their own time form, which coincides though with that of the object things), gives a unity to all this subjective, which is not a unity in content, that is, no extensive unit, but has a quasi-temporal stretch through the identity of an Ego relating to every time point in the same way. The Ego’s act has an extensive being, it is in every time point a new time content; everything within the behavior, the being responsible, etc., actually filling up time, is something ever again individually differentiated, some constantly other thing from point to point. The Ego though behaving thus, is identical; there is nothing identical within the content. We say, the I lives its primal life in such a way that it is continuously an experience with an ever new content stretching continuously into time [288], but in such a way that the identical thing giving unity is a contentless – not substrate – but life subject, bearing a relationship to the objects, to the Ego foreign in such and such a way.